



That’s great on paper… but not in practice! – A routine ecology perspective 
to understand M&A integration barriers  
 
Abstract  
Building on the endogenous routine dynamic perspective, we aim to understand the 
micro-foundations of capability transfer in post-acquisition integration. Based on a single, 
longitudinal case study of an acquisition in the consultancy sector, we apply a practice-based 
lens to study the intended combination of two existing routines in an acquisition process and 
why its implementation turned out to be a failure. Our findings suggest that seemingly 
matching capabilities were not compatible in practice as the underlying sequences of action 
were incompatible and their embeddedness in its intra- and inter-organizational ecology of 
routines was not considered. Our article sheds light on the role of routines in acquisition 
integration and contributes to literature by discussing a) the prevailing role of the 
interconnectedness of routines in effective capability transfer and b) discrepancies between 
ostensive and performative aspects of routines as impediments to the implementation of the 
pre-acquisition plan in the post-acquisition phase.  
 
 
Keywords. Post-acquisition integration, synergy creation, capability transfer, routine 






Mergers and acquisitions are a crucial means to obtain resources and capabilities 
needed to sustain a firm’s competitive advantage in the long run (Graebner 2004). Yet, 
creating value from acquisition operations is difficult and recent studies show that less than 
50% of the acquirers achieve the expected goals and synergies (Schoenberg 2006; Zollo and 
Meier 2008).  
One explanation for failure is the untapped synergy potential which is determined by 
similarities and complementarities between the two organizations. Spotting potential 
complementarities in the pre-acquisition phase is considered a decisive step for future success 
(Gomes, Angwin, Weber, & Yedidia Tarba, 2013). However, synergistic benefits are linked 
to the managerial capacity to successfully exploit such complementarities. Their effective 
implementation requires interactions conducive to building a supportive environment for 
transferring capabilities and creating knowledge to achieve the acquisition’s purpose 
(Birkinshaw et al. 2000; Bresman et al. 1999; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Different 
authors (Heimeriks et al. 2012; Mitchell and Shaver 2003; Zollo and Singh 2004) point 
towards the necessity to develop specific capabilities for acquisition integration, arguing that 
learning is not automatic but requires human effort. Other studies emphasize different types of 
difficulty such as structural, cultural and human that make the integration process harder and 
impede synergistic benefits (Birkinshaw et al. 2000; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Jemison 
and Sitkin 1986; Larsson and Finkelstein 1999; Shrivastava 1986). 
While we know that capabilities need to be transferred between acquirer and target, 
more insights need to be gained on how this transfer actually works in practice. Capabilities 
have mainly been approached from a macro perspective: they have been considered as entities 
that can be designed up-front and transferred from one organization to another (Parmigiani 
and Howard-Grenville 2011). In practice, however, capability transfers that have been pre-
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defined on paper often do not materialize (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Further, current 
literature views the pre-and the post-acquisition phases as independent occurrences leading to 
a lack of empirical insights on what happens during the integration process. 
In this paper, we borrow from the endogenous routine dynamic perspective (Feldman, 
2000; Feldman et al., 2008) to study how different routines are integrated within acquisition 
processes. Doing so, we aim at unpacking capabilities and focus on the underlying bundles or 
ecologies of routines (Salvato, 2009; Sele and Grand, 2016) that are considered as the 
building blocks of capabilities (Dutta et al., 2003). This approach allows us to better 
understand the everyday enactment of capability integration as it happens and unfolds. Based 
on a practice perspective (Parmigiani et al., 2011), we define routines as “repetitive patterns 
of interdependent organizational actions carried out by multiple participants” (Feldman, 
2003). We consider them as important for core organizational phenomena such as change, 
learning, and knowledge transfer (Pentland et al., 2005 ; Pentland et al., 2016) that are 
required in post-acquisition integration. Routines can be taken apart to examine the mutually 
constitutive interaction of ostensive and performative aspects (Feldmand and Pentland, 2003). 
While the ostensive aspects can be described as the overall pattern or current structure of a 
routine, the performative aspects constitute the routine in practice and its particular patterns of 
action. Based on this perspective, Pentland and Feldman (2008) criticize the idea that routines 
might be designed up-front because it is unclear what “patterns of action” will eventually 
emerge. They therefore argue that routines are a product of human action. 
We use this theoretical lens to study the planned combination of two existing routines 
in an acquisition process and thereby shed light on the role of routines for successful 
integration. Our paper draws on a single, longitudinal in-depth case study of an acquisition in 
the consultancy sector. Both are French SMEs located in Paris. Our data consists of 40 
qualitative interviews with partners and consultants from both companies taking place from 
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the moment of the acquisition until one and half years afterwards. Our analysis showed that 
the combination of routines did not create the expected benefits because they appeared to be 
incompatible in practice – a matter of fact that was revealed when studying the routines from 
a performative lens (Latour 2005). Further, the connectedness of the routine with other 
adjacent routines, i.e. market and organization routines, within each organization appeared as 
another important barrier for the new routine to be implemented effectively. We argue that a 
routine approach allows to better understand the everyday enactment of capability integration 
and to shed light on an important source of liability for post-acquisition performance.   
This paper makes three distinct contributions. First, contribute to research on 
capability transfer in M&A, proposing a micro-organizational, dynamic and practice-based 
analysis of M&A integration process. Second, we extent M&A literature on the 
interconnectedness of pre- and post-acquisition processes, showing how the lack of 
connection between both can be a liability for post-acquisition performance (Gomes et al, 
2013). Third, we contribute to the literature on routine dynamics (Feldman and Pentland 
2008). We shed light on the interconnectedness of routines at an intra- and inter-
organizational level. So far, the focus has mainly been on the relationships of intra-
organizational routines (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). Finally, our findings 
focusing on the ecology of routines provide an embedded understanding of the integration 
process and consequently answer multiple calls for contextualized research in the realm of 
M&A and routines (Turner and Rindova 2012). 
In what follows, we present our underlying theoretical background. We first present an 
overview of research from the field of M&A and more in particular post-acquisition 
integration to then explain the usefulness to approach the phenomenon that we intend to study 
– combining seemingly matching routines in an acquisition process – from a routine dynamic 
perspective. We continue with a description of the research setting, data collection and data 
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analysis before our findings. Finally, we discuss how these findings contribute to our 





Creating synergies through complementary capabilities. Mergers and acquisitions 
are a crucial means to obtain resources and capabilities needed to sustain a firm’s competitive 
advantage in the long run (Graebner 2004). In related acquisitions, superior performance can 
be achieved if organizational combination leads to synergies, i.e. if the combined 
organizations create more value than each can achieve alone (Chatterjee, 1986). Larsson and 
Finkelstein (1999) proposed that the synergy potential of an acquisition is determined by 
similarities and complementarities between the two partners involved in the acquisition. Later 
on, Harrison et al. (2001) argued that synergetic benefits are more likely to create abnormal 
results when based on complementarities rather than on similarities. Complementary 
capabilities are capabilities that reside in the merging organizations that are “not identical and 
yet simultaneously complementing each other” (Harrison et al, 2001: 680). Spotting the 
complementary capabilities in each of the two firms and evaluating the synergy potential is 
thus a decisive step in the pre-acquisition phase. However, extant literature shows that the 
acquirer exploits the actual synergy potential only over time and as companies start working 
together and engage in resource transfer and combination (Greenwood et al, 1994). In other 
words, in the pre-deal phase it’s difficult to precisely anticipate what the integration phase 
will look like. Another important element to evaluate in the pre-deal phase is the degree of 
integration required to take full advantage of the deal (Haspeslgah and Jemison, 1991). 
Finding the balance between integration and autonomy of the acquired firm is an essential 




Transferring strategic capabilities. The transfer of strategic capabilities is at the heart 
of the integration process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The integration process consists of 
interactions that constitute the environment for transferring capabilities and creating 
knowledge to achieve the acquisition’s purpose (Birkinshaw et al. 2000; Bresman et al. 1999; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Capabilities transfer relates to operational resource sharing 
transfer of functional skills and transfer of general management skills. Overall, the aim of the 
integration phase is to create an “atmosphere supportive of capability transfer” (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991). Capability transfer and resource redeployment has been extensively 
analyzed in the M&A literature (Capron et al, 1998, Capron, 1999; Capron and Pistre 2002). 
“Resource redeployment” is the extent to which a target or acquiring firm uses the other 
firm’s resources (R&D capabilities, manufacturing know-how, marketing resources, supplier 
relationships, and distribution expertise), which may involve physical transfer of resources to 
new locations or sharing resources without physical transfer (Capron, 1999: 988). This 
literature shows that firms involved in acquisition tend to transfer complementary capabilities 
to each other and that theses transfers ultimately influence the outcomes of the acquisition. In 
this stream of research, capabilities are often approached as “Lego building blocks” that 
can/should be transferred from one firm to the other to implement expected synergies and 
foster the overall financial performance of the combined organization. In other words, the 
level of analysis remains rather macro. Existing literature focuses predominantly at the 
organisational level of analysis (Angwin and Urs, 2014) subsequently examining issues such 
as knowledge transfer (Zollo & Singh, 2004), structural fit (Angwin & Meadows, 2012; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), leadership alignment (Waldman & Javidan, 2009), culture 
(Bauer & Matzler, 2013; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Stahl, Chua, & Pablo, 2012) and 
autonomy (Zaheer, Castañer, & Souder, 2013). 
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Overall, M&A scholars barely tried to open the black box of these “Lego building 
blocks” to understand what micro mechanisms favor capabilities transfer and ultimately the 
implementation of the planned synergies. More recently researchers have tried to capture 
variables that affect capability transfer to propose a more fine-grained analysis. For instance, 
Bjokman, Stahl and Vaara (2007) proposed a model of the key factors that mediate the effect 
of cultural differences between the acquiring and the acquired firms on the extent to which 
capability transfer takes place from one to another. However, there is still a need to adopt a 
micro perspective to unpack capability transfer in post-acquisition integration. As Angwin 
and Urs (2014: 156) underlined, M&A scholars should look more inside organizations to 
obtain a more in-depth understanding of how sub-organizational units can affect acquisition 
integration performance . 
 
Connecting pre- and post-acquisition phases. Another limit in the M&A literature is 
the lack of connection between pre and post acquisition phases (Gomes, Angwin, Weber, & 
Yedidia Tarba, 2013). While calls for processual approaches are enduring in the literature 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Meglio & Risberg, 2010; Risberg, 
2001), true processual M&A studies remain relatively rare. In other words, studies tend to 
remain "within" phase (either pre-acquisition or post-acquisition) rather than analyzing 
linkages throughout the whole M&A process. Recent research has shown that connecting 
between pre- and post-merger stages may yield better M&A performance in general (Weber, 
Tarba, & Rozen Bachar, 2011). Consequently, analyzing pre and post-acquisition phases as 
interconnected steps and not as stand alone phases could favor findings that better reflect the 
reality of M&A practice. 
 
Angwin and Vaara (2005) underlined the importance of connectivity in M&A 
processes. Connectivity can be understood as a “metaphor that highlights the complexities, 
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interconnected processes and synchronized activities in organizations and their contexts” 
(Angwin and Vaara, 2005: 1449). As the authors stress, M&A are highly contextual events 
where the organizations to be combined have to be thought of as independent entities which 
have a history of operating in a particular environment, with particular processes, norms, etc. 
In the course of acquisition integration, interdependencies have to emerge, as well as on the 
organizational level as the one of individual interactions. It is this emergent connectivity that 
has to be addressed on a multi-level and from an encompassing comprehensive point of view.  
 
To sum up, the constantly growing literature on M&A has generated a vast fan of 
contribution geared toward a better understanding of the integration process.  However the 
extant research has focused on certain perspectives and failed to interrogate others 
subsequently leaving some gaps in the literature. We found three major gaps that we will 
address in this article: (1) lack of micro-level perspective in the study of M&A, (2) lack of 
connection between pre and post-acquisition phase, (3) lack of contextualization in the 
analysis of the integration process. Drawing on the routine dynamic research, we intend to 
address these gaps from a practice perspective as we will outline below. 
 
A ‘Routine Dynamic’ Perspective on Post-Acquisition Integration  
 Based on a practice perspective (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011), we define routines 
as “repetitive patterns of interdependent organizational actions carried out by multiple 
participants” (Feldman 2003). We consider them as important for core organizational 
phenomena such as change, learning, and knowledge transfer (Pentland and Feldman 2005) 
that are required in post-acquisition integration. Routines can be taken apart to examine the 
mutually constitutive interaction of ostensive and performative aspects (Salvato and Rerup 
2011). While the ostensive aspects can be described as the overall pattern or current structure 
of a routine, the performative aspects constitute the routine in practice and its particular 
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sequences of action. Based on this perspective, Pentland and Feldman (2008) criticize the idea 
that routines might be designed up-front because it is unclear what “patterns of action” will 
eventually emerge. They therefore argue that routines are a product of ongoing human action.  
 
“While there is a significant body of research into the nature of routines, much of this research 
has focused upon a routine in isolation, rather than its amalgamation with another routine to 
form new routines or bundles of routines. The research has also tended to focus upon a routine 
of a single organisation rather than examining the fusion of routines across different 
organisations. The discussion of routines has also tended to downplay the role of other 
contexts, such as the macro context, in the evolution of routines” (Angwin and Urs, 2014: 
155). 
 
In order to understand what happens in practice when routines are intendedly brought 
together, we borrow from the endogenous routine dynamics perspective (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2002). By shifting the focus from considering routines as entities to routines as parts 
(Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville 2011) conceptualizing routines as the mutual constitution of 
ostensive and performative aspects has proven fruitful to understand in the actual enactment 
of routines. While the ostensive stands for the embodied patterns that we are able to discern, 
the performative stands for the situative enactment of the different steps as routine is made up 
of. Thereby, the practice perspective allows us to consider capabilities and their underlying 
routines not as largely stable entities that can be transferred from one context to another but as 
emerging and developing through their continuous performance. In that sense, it rejects the 
idea that routines can be designed up front (Pentland & Feldman 2008). An idea that is 
supported by Mintzberg’s notion of intended and emergent strategies. In our case this means 




In the literature, several scholars have applied routine perspective to the analysis of the micro-
foundations of integration performance. For instance, Paruchuri and Eisenman (2012) focus 
on investor networks to analyze how the activities underlying firm’s R&D change in the 
aftermath of a merger. They propose that inventors might be affected by the disruption of 
their day-to-day routines in the integration process depending on their centrality in the intra-
firm network. They thus try to analyze how change in terms of individual-level processes 
comes about in response to change at organizational level. They found that in the post-merger 
context characterized by anxiety and uncertainty, the knowledge generated by more central 
inventors becomes more important to the firm’s R&D activities but that the knowledge 
generated by inventors spanning larger structural holes becomes less so (Paruchuri and 
Eisenman, 2012: 1527).  
Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates (2012), study the underlying mechanisms of deliberate 
learning in the context of post-acquisition integration. They build on Zollo & Winter’s work 
(2002) on learning codification and on dynamic capabilities literature (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997). Using mixed-methods, they show that successful active acquirers develop 
higher-order routines—as manifested in complementary sets of concrete organizational 
practices—that foster ad hoc problem solving whenever the specific acquisition at hand 
deviates sufficiently from the norm, thus counteracting the inertial forces brought forth by 
(zero-order) codified integration routines (Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates, 2012: 719). They 
consequently contribute to a finer grained analysis of learning in post-acquisition integration.  
The two articles mentioned above focus on the post-acquisition phase. On the contrary, the 
following article aims at better understanding the links between synergy expectations and 
acquisition performance outcome. Indeed, Angwin and Urs (2014) examine ordinary routine 
amalgamation and their impact upon meta-routine outcome during the post-acquisition 
integration process. Using a qualitative approach, they study routine combination and routine 
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superimposition. They show how functions are brought together during the integration 
process, they show how routines become unstable and thus result in negative performance 
outcomes (Angwin and Urs, 2014: 175).  
In our article, we intend to build on this theoretical perspective and analyze the following 
research question throughout an in-depth single case study: “How does interconnectedness of 





We chose a case suitable to the phenomenon under study (Eisenhardt 1989): a 
horizontal acquisition in the French recruitment consultancy sector. At the end of 2009, the 
acquirer bought the target following the latter’s entrance into insolvency proceedings. As the 
procedures foresee, employees of the target were consulted on their preferences for one of the 
three potential acquirers and voted unanimously for the Lincoln. For the latter, the takeover 
was an opportunity to expand its geographical reach and to extend its commercial offer. 
Whereas the acquirer is located in Paris, the target has offices in Paris and three other major 
French cities.  
The two firms had been present in the market for about ten years prior to the 
acquisition. Both are SMEs, the acquirer having a workforce of 31 people, the target counting 
22 members. After the acquisition, both entities remained separate, maintaining their brands 
and offices, but were supposed to develop strong operational interdependencies that allowed 
for synergies to be created and exploited in the months following the takeover. The 
acquisition can, therefore, be characterized as symbiotic (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) – an 
integration approach that combines the preservation of both firms’ autonomy, while building 
high interdependencies between them.  
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While both the acquirer and the target are specialized in recruitment services, their 
work methods and practices vary as illustrated in Table 1. Differences include types of clients, 
methods and techniques used to identify and contact potential job candidates, the hierarchical 
level of jobs to promote, and the internal organization of work processes. The acquirer’s main 
clients were large companies, seeking for filling managerial positions at high hierarchical 
levels. To achieve this goal, consultants used headhunting as their focal method to identify 
rare talents that would fit the job requirements. Practically speaking, headhunters would 
contact a set of preliminarily identified people who are currently employed and do not 
necessarily seek to change position. The goal would be to convince these people for an 
interview for a job that the candidate gets no information on at that time. The target’s client 
base on the other hand was mainly composed of SMEs seeking to hire middle-managers or, 
more often, salespeople. The dominant technique used by consultants to identify job 
candidates was the publication of job ads that would allow attracting a large pool of 
applications.   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The marked differences between the acquirer and the target might have been thought 
of as an obstacle to a successful acquisition. However, the top management of the acquiring 
company considered the differences in terms of work processes, client portfolios and 
commercial offers as a valuable source for synergies. Especially the complementarities of a 
joint commercial offers – combining headhunting with the HR assessment tool and 
management training modules of the target – was considered promising and an important 
source for value creation. 
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This paper focuses on the integration of the commercial offers after the acquisition 
was concluded. More in particular, we zoom in on how a new offer was designed, 
implemented and executed while keeping the two companies as separate entities. Doing so, 
we are able to show how seemingly matching processes partially failed as the integration of 
the different routines created disruptions between routines within both companies as well as 
between them.  
 
Data collection 
Longitudinal qualitative data were collected over a period of 12 months, tracing in real 
time the acquisition as such as well as the post-acquisition integration process. To avoid 
potential bias from a single data source or informant (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1994), we used a 
range of data sources.  
Interviews. As summarized in Table 2, the first author conducted 40 interviews with 
twenty-six respondents from the target and the acquirer at two different times: at the time of 
the acquisition (period 1) and one year later (period 2). The interviews were held with 
individuals from different ranks and functions of the companies, including junior consultants, 
senior consultants, assistants and managers. Interviews were semi-structured and lasted 
between 60 and 120 minutes.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
At period 1, no interactions between consultants had yet taken place. Interviews 
concerned mainly current work processes and methods, work relations inside the pre-
acquisition units and individual expectations and opinions regarding the acquisition project 
and the projected synergies. These topics were also central during the interviews in period 2. 
In addition, consultants were also asked about work relations, formal or informal, that 
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developed with consultants of the other firm during the past year or, on the contrary, why 
relations that may have been expected to develop did not do so. Interviewees were also asked 
to describe how work processes and relations with colleagues evolved in their focal company. 
Observation and Documents. Although interviews with participants are a valuable 
and appropriate source from a practice perspective, we complemented the interview data with 
observational data as well as with documents that were shared with us or were publicly 
available. More in particular, the first author participated in internal workshops, seminars and 
events and was able to access internally elaborated documents from working groups involved 
in acquisition integration planning. 
 
Data analysis 
Initially, our research was driven by the question: why do many post-acquisition 
integration processes fail despite the fact that the merging parties have extensively worked on 
how synergies and complementarities can be achieved? More in particular, we were interested 
in how people evaluate the integration potential and what happens during the real integration. 
Following an inductive and open-ended research design (Strauss and Corbin 1998), we 
oriented our search towards integration practices and processes. A topic that sparked our mind 
was the strong focus in the current literature on post-acquisition processes on how the 
integration needs to be executed without a particular emphasis on the practices or 
organizational routines that are being integrated. With the interest in the role of organizational 
routines in mind, we iterated between the empirical material, the emerging observations, and 
the existing literature (Locke 2001) and decided that bringing in insights from the routine 
dynamics research (Feldman and Pentland 2003, Feldman et al. 2016) could be very fruitful to 
focus on the actual performance of routines instead of on their design. 
To make sense of the data, our analysis progressed in two stages. First, the author who 
collected the data wrote descriptions of the two routines that the acquirer intended to integrate 
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in a combined offer. Based on these descriptions, we identified the sequences of actions of the 
two routines and of the combined routines. Second, we coded all interviews in again two 
steps. First, we coded the interviews at the time of acquisition to be able to describe the 
recruitment routines in terms of its embodied patterns (ostensive aspects) in each of the two 
companies and to understand the ex-ante reasons for bringing the two routines together. In a 
second step, we coded the interviews that took place one year after the acquisition to 
understand how the two routines were combined and what were the ex-post reasons for the 
dysfunctionality.  
 
WHEN ROUTINES DO NOT MATCH 
In what follows we will first describe the two existing recruitment routines at each 
firm (Routine 1 and 2) as well as the intended new routine as it was conceived pre-acquisition 
(Routine 3a). We then will explain the actual implementation of this new routine (Routine 3b) 
and why its implementation turned out to be a failure.  In a last step we will interpret this 
failure to how the interconnectedness of routines plays a central role in synergy creation. 
 
Pre-Acquisition Phase 
Routine 1. At the acquirer, it is always a team of two consultants (supported by two 
assistants) who treat job search assignments. Working in pairs aims at mentoring less 
experienced consultants or to regroup consultants with different areas of expertise. The 
collaborative work process is seen by management as one main distinctive competitive trait 
and is fundamentally rooted in the firm’s culture.  
Consultants are specialized and organized in pools dealing with a particular market or 
job domain such as finance, IT, or supply chain. This specialization aims at being capable to 
better assess clients’ needs and candidates’ profiles, and to develop a large network of clients 
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and potential candidates in a given area. The recruitment routine at the acquirer is composed 
of several steps summarized in Table 3.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Routine 2. At the target, consultants do not work in teams but are alone in charge of a 
given assignment. Similar to the acquirer's routine, consultants are supported by an assistant. 
Consultants are not specialized, but explicitly present themselves as generalists, capable of 
finding personnel for any position in any sector thanks to their experience and particular work 
process. The recruitment routine (Routine 2) at the target is again composed of several steps 
summarized in Table 4.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Routine 3a (intended). The acquisition project foresaw a systematic integration of the 
target firm’s assessment tool into the acquirer’s recruitment process. This would strengthen 
the services offered to clients and would therefore allow to charge higher service fees. The 
joint offer would combine the recruitment process of the acquirer with the evaluation of final 
candidates using the assessment tool of the target as illustrated in Figure 1. A consultant from 
the acquirer would carry out the recruitment process as usual and present the final selected 
candidates to the client . The target firm would evaluate these finalists with their assessment 
tool and give an additional feedback to the client about the candidates’ suitability for the 
defined job . The client would pay a supplementary fee for these evaluations (about € 1500 for 
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each evaluation). The acquirer’s consultant would receive 20% of this fee, the target firm’s 
consultant 80%. 
------------------------------------- 




Routine 3b (implemented). While the combined offer and its underlying work process 
had been seen as promising by consultants of both firms at the moment of the acquisition, the 
picture changed after a few months. Discrepancies appeared between the routine’s design and 
its actual implementation and had as consequence that consultants raised strong doubts about 
the efficiency of the combined routine. They perceived no real added value in using it 
compared to the each routine operated separately, and eventually finished by rejecting it.   
These doubts and apprehensions only appeared once the new routine had been implemented. 
Concrete experience revealed incompatibilities of routines in terms of actual sequences of 
action as well as with other organizational processes and routines in which both routines are 
embedded. In the following we provide with four narratives to illustrate the root causes of 
these incompatibilities, in terms of within-routine sequences of action, and in terms of 
routines’ ecology. .. 
 
Incompatible sequences of action within routine 
The first problem concerned the actual implementation of the newly designed routine during 
two concrete assignments. As foreseen, consultants at the acquirer selected in a first step three 
potential job candidates through the usual headhunting process and presented these to the 
client. Afterwards, the finalists were evaluated with the assessment tool by consultants at the 
target. In both cases, candidates’ assessment showed incompatibilities with the psycho-
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sociological profile defined for the given job position, so that all candidates selected by the 
acquirer’s consultant were rejected by their counterparts at the target. These conflicting 
outcomes were perceived all the more distressing in light of the rarity of the headhunted 
profiles, for which consultants at the acquirer had a hard time to find any candidate. In 
addition, as candidates had already been presented to clients as suitable, their disqualification 
by the assessment tool jeopardized the acquirer’s consultants’ work quality and credibility. 
They looked at the acquired assessment tool as a highly time-consuming and complicated tool 
whose value was hard to sell to clients. As this senior consultant put it, they perceived their 
own approach as being overly ‘more profitable: it is less time-consuming, more effective.’ 
  
‘The use of a combined recruitment process has raised conflicts. It turned out to 
be actually very complicated. Candidates were selected through our regular 
recruitment process and presented to the client. Then Y [acquired firm] evaluated 
the candidates and said ‘no, they do not fit’. In that case, we had worked for 
nothing and we had to find new candidates all over again. As it became 
complicated, we chose to work without their assessment process. I will not make 
use of it, since I run the risk of having to redo the selection process or having to 
propose twice the number of candidates in the hope that it will work out.’ (Senior 
consultant, acquirer) 
‘It is very irritating for the client relationship when candidates I recommended 
are afterwards rejected by the assessment process of the acquired firm. It strongly 
weakens my credibility towards my client.’ (Senior consultant, acquirer)  
 
 Incompatibility with other routines  
In addition to incompatibilities of both routines, we will now address why the combination of 
both routines because of their interdependencies with adjacent routines was not considered in 
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design and inhibited on integrating them in practice. Table 5 presents interaction effects of the 
new recruitment routine with adjacent routines maintained in both organizations. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
We will illustrate this point highlighting more in detail the connectedness with two adjacent 
routines, and which had a disruptive effect on the implementation of the combined 
recruitment routine: market routines and organization routines.  
 
Market routine 
The acquirer’s main clients are large groups, seeking for hiring personnel for managerial 
positions at high hierarchical levels (management and top management levels). The 
positioning is high-end (headhunting). Job candidates are important resources and seen as 
future potential clients. They are also a rare resource. Acquirer consultants use headhunting as 
the focal method to identify rare talents that would fit the job requirements. Headhunting 
implies that the consultant contacts a person who is already employed and does not seek 
necessarily for changing position, trying to convince him to come to an interview for a job 
that the candidate gets no information on at that time. So the resource is hard to find, and is 
also not easily available. 
By contrast, the acquired firm’s client base is mainly composed of SMEs seeking to fill job 
positions at employee or middle-management levels, and mainly sales persons. The dominant 
technique used by consultants to identify job candidates is the publication of job ads (online 
and print), attracting a large pool of applications.  
These different market routines had disruptive effects for implementing the new integrated 
routine. The market positioning of the acquirer is based on high-end, customized headhunting 
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to find rather rare experts with particular competences. Their psychological profile and 
motivation, as being central features of the target’s assessment tool, is thus largely secondary. 




At the acquired company, consultants are not specialized but explicitly present themselves as 
generalists, capable of finding personnel for any position in any sector thanks to their 
experience and particular work process. The latter includes a strong implication of the hiring 
firm in the recruitment process and an in-house visit where the consultant spends one day at 
the beginning of an assignment at the client’s company in order to talk to the candidate’s 
future management and colleagues and to get an insight view of the future work place. There 
is no shared information system or database. Work results (reports, assessments, candidate 
appreciation) are stored on paper and also transmitted to the client on paper. 
At the acquirer, consultants are specialists and divided into expert domains (Finance, IT, 
Purchasing, Supply chain, Legal), i.e. they will deal with assignments concerning their sector 
of specialization. If a consultant specialized in finance receives an assignment for a job in 
another industry or job function not related to finance, he will have this assignment produced 
(so sub-contracted) by a colleague specialized in the given domain. They share their working 
space (open space) to promote communication between consultants, promote information 
exchange on clients and candidates. This organization routine directly supports the 
collaborative business model.  
These different organization routines effected the implementation of the combined routine. As 
at the acquirer a consultant is an expert of a given industry / job function, but at the target 
consultants are generalists, so working on all type of jobs or industries, the likelihood that a 
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generalist would sub-contract an assignment to an expert is low. The benefit is thus overly 
unilateral, in favor of the acquired consultants. Further, the assessment tool generates paper 
based extensive reports which are not conveying the high-end positioning when 
communicated to clients.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our study shows how the intended combination of two existing routines failed due to 
their incompatibility in practice. By adopting the endogenous routine dynamic perspective, we 
contribute to the understanding of the micro-foundation of capability transfer in acquisitions. 
By opening up the black box and focusing on the ostensive and the performative aspects of 
routines we are able to show that seemingly matching capabilities might not be compatible as 
the sequences of action cannot be easily combined (Feldman 2003). By definition, during the 
due diligence process, it is difficult for the acquirer to grasp the sequence of action of each 
routine or capability that is intended to be exploited in the future. In fact, the definition of a 
combined routine did not lead to the expected value creation.  
These findings contribute to the extensive literature on post-acquisition integration by 
unpacking the role of routines (Birkinshaw et al. 2000; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; 
Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). 
Further, by focusing on the compatibility of routines we can address the lack of 
connection between pre- and post-merger phases (Gomes et al. 2013). The routine dynamic 
view with its processual characterization of organizational phenomena helps to develop a 
truly longitudinal design in which the researcher observes the routines development over time 
and thus across pre- and post-phase. 
By rejecting the idea that capability transfer is an unproblematic process, we shed light 
on the importance of anticipating the potential issues in combining routines early on in the 
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pre-acquisition phase. This contributes to the literature on compatibility / fit (strategic, 
organizational and cultural) as it adds a micro approach. The routine dynamics view allows us 
to see differences on the level of situated performances which cannot be identified if routines 
are considered as entities.  
Our study also contributes to the literature on sensemaking and political issues in post-
acquisition integration by underlining the importance of agency and human actors in 
acquisition processes (Monin et al. 2013; Vaara et al. 2005).  
From a routine perspective, our findings can add to the understanding of how routines 
influence strategic organizational processes and outcomes. 
From a managerial point of view, adopting a practice perspective on organizational 
routines, we argue that in addition to synergies definition in the pre-deal phase, firms 
engaging in an acquisition process should pay attention to the actual compatibility of 
organizational routines in their decision-making process. Indeed, an acquisition can be very 
attractive on the paper, but synergies can only be realized if organizational routines are 
compatible once put into action. One might even assume that in practice designing synergies 
in the pre-deal phase is a myth. 
This research is not without limitations. It is based on a single case study of a 
symbiotic integration.  Future studies should examine whether our findings about the routine 
match and routine ecology are replicable in other types of integration processes such as 
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Table 1: Overview of the Companies 
Criteria Acquirer Target 
Number of employees 31 22 
Average age 38 36 
Average tenure 4.5 8 
Type of offer Recruiting consultancy Recruiting, evaluation and training 
consultancy 
Sector competences Finance, IT, Purchasing, Supply 
chain, Legal 
Health, Marketing, Retail 
 
Modes of working Teams Individual 






Table 2: Overview of Interviews 
  1
st
 interview series 2
nd
 interview series 
(in parenthesis number of 
respondents interviewed 















Partners 2 4 (4)[1] 4 6 
Consultants 5 6 (3) 6 11 
Assistants 2 1 (1) 2 3 
Admin. Personnel 
  
1 1 (1) 1 2 
Acquired firm 9 9 (5) 13 18 
Partners 1 1 (0) 2 2 
Consultants 5 7 (4) 8 12 
Assistants 2 1 (1) 2 3 
Admin. personnel 1 0 1 1 




[1] At the acquirer, two consultants, who were interviewed during both interview waves, were promoted partners 









Table 3: Pre-Acquisition Routines at the Acquirer 
Steps Empirical examples 
(1) A senior consultant A meets 
with a client who needs to recruit a 
person for a given job position 
(description of job position, needs 
and required profile and 
competencies) 
 
“Initially, it’s about is defining the need with the client, set the missions 
assigned to the person sought, define the position, set the profile, define 
the content of the mission, and define how the person will interact with 
the other poles of the structure” (consultant). 
(2) Consultant A sub-contracts the 
assignment to a second consultant 
B. Consultant A remains the 
client’s agent but is not involved in 
the assignment workload, e.g., the 
actual recruitment process, which 
is carried out entirely by consultant 
B. Assignment fees are split 
between both consultant with 
consultant A receiving 30% and 
consultant B receiving 70%. 
Depending on whether the job 
position concerns the specialty of 
consultant A’s sector / industry 
pool, the assignment is sub-
contracted to a junior consultant 
within the same pool, or if it 
concerns a different sector, to a 
consultant of a different pool (for 
instance, if consultant A of the 
finance pool is hired by a bank to 
recruit an IT specialist, consultant 
A sub-contracts to a consultant of 
the IT pool). 
 
“For example, I work with someone from the finance department, I 
define the mission and that person will just manage their account and 
keep in touch with the client. (...) In this case, I do a 100 % of the job 
because he doesn’t know anything about computers, so I let him know 
where I am in my mission, he reads the reports and I ask him to restart 
the client when there are short lists of candidates. We share the work like 
this. Anyway I do 100 % of the production and he keeps the contact with 
the customer to  find out where they are in the process etc In terms of 
remuneration, one third will be for [consultant X] as holder of the 
account and two thirds will be for me as a producer of the mission” 
(consultant). 
 
“There is always a consultant who keeps the connection with the client. 
It’s the person who won the mission who keeps the connection with the 
client”. (consultant) 
 
“I’ll take 33 % because I brought the mission, then he will manage 
everything : he will do the recruitment, look for candidates, meet them 
and prepare the short list. I keep the connection with the client in the 
recruitment process”. (consultant) 
(3) Consultant B, together with a 
research assistant (interns who stay 
for 6 months and work for two 
consultants at the same time), 
searches for potential job 
candidates (in the internal 
candidates database, social 
network websites, personal 
candidate portfolio, etc.) 
 
“We contact directly the targets. It’s a lot of phone calls and 
convocations to job talks when the persons contacted are interested by 
the offer”. (consultant) 
 
“When we have a new mission, we seek the support of research assistant 
in our staff to find come candidates. We split the tasks. Some will look 
for lawyers ‘profiles, other will look for legal expert. We divide the work 
but we always work in team”(consultant). 
 
Being a research assistant, I work with one or two consultant on each 
mission. The consultant provides me information about the needs and the 
job profile. Then the consultant provides me information about the target 
companies in which we could find potential candidates. The  consultant 
also provides me a methodology” (research assistant). 
 
(4) Consultant B and the research 
assistant contact potential 
“We then run an evaluation to determine whether the candidate is 
adapted to the job profile. We evaluate both the motivation and the 
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candidates by phone and select 
those who correspond to the 
defined profile and who are 
available (i.e. those who consider 
changing jobs). At that time, no 
information about the client (i.e. 
the potential employer) is revealed. 
technical skills of the candidate”  (consultant). 
 
“I work with the research assistants. We split the targets and we look for 
candidates in a parallel way. So I do work a lot on candidate seeking on 
job boards and social networks such as Viadeo, Linkedin, etc. Then I 
select the candidates, I contact them and I meet them for a job talk”  
(consultant). 
 
“We do headhunting in team with the research assistants. We try to 
identify candidates from target companies” (consultant). 
 
“Both the research assistant and I do headhunting and try to find 
candidates”(consultant). 
 
The research assistant search for candidates, he organizes and attends the 
job talk to see the fruits of his work” (consultant).  
 
“Together with the consultant, we try to find the good profiles, to contact 
the potential candidates and to organize a meeting” (Research assistant). 
 
(5) Consultant B, sometimes 
joined by consultant A, meets 
potential candidates for an 
individual interview. Now the 
identity of the potential employer 
is revealed. 
 
“We meet the candidates and then we present a short list to the client” 
(Consultant). 
 
During a job talk, the first consultant meet the candidate for a while and 
then the second consultant comes to the meeting for the last 10-15 
minutes to clarify whether the candidate has understood the job profile, 
to see how he reacts to the job offer. Being two consultants during the 
interview helps us to confront our ideas about the candidate. After the 
meeting, the consultant who won the mission keeps the connection with 
the client, not the other consultant” (Consultant). 
 
(6) Consultant B may then ask the 
candidate to fill out a short 
questionnaire processed with an 
assessment tool that provides 
information on the candidate’s 
behavior in a professional setting 
(sociability, decision-making, 
leadership abilities, etc.). The tool 
is computer-based and demands 
approximately 20 minutes to be 
filled in and analyzed. The 
assessment tool is not used as a 
selection tool but provides an 
additional source of information 
on a candidate’s profile in case of 
uncertainty or doubt. Consultants 
generally believe that the 
assessment of candidates should be 
rather based on their competency 
as consultant, i.e. their expertise, 
experience, and intuition. 
 
“To make sure that we are as objective as possible, we have decided to 
use a behavioral assessment, called “Performance”, well-known by 
companies and consulting firms. It’s rather simple, the candidate has to 
answer to 70 questions online. Both the candidate and us receive the 
results of this assessment with a personality profile. It’s a base for 
discussion with the candidate, it’s not a tool of selection but a base for 





(7) Consultant B selects up to three 
suitable candidates. As the 
respective job positions require 
mainly particular and rare profiles 
(high seniority / top management, 
strong expertise) and as candidates 
are headhunted (so not necessarily 
available), it is not rare that only 
one or two potential candidates are 
selected. 
“We meet the candidates and then we present a short list to the client” 
(Consultant). 
 
“We use a direct approach on highly specific profiles” (Consultant). 
(8) In a final step, consultant B 
presents the selected candidates to 
his client. The client meets the 
candidates and eventually decides 
whom to make an offer. 
“Once we have shortlisted 2 to 3 candidates, we brief them and we 
follow them until the closure of the mission that is to say until a person is 
eventually selected” (Consultant). 
 
 
(9) The consultant follows the 
candidate and the client for a 
period of six to twelve months, 
monitoring if the candidates’ 
integration goes well and if the job 
corresponds to the candidates’ 
expectations. 
 
“We follow the candidate until his/her integration in the company and 
until the end of the probation period. We usually have phone call with 
the person and meet him/her for a lunch two months after his/her 





Table 4: Pre-Acquisition Routines at the Target 
 
Steps Empirical examples 
(1) A consultant meets with a 
client who needs to recruit a 
person for a given job position 
(description of job position, needs 
and required profile and 
competencies). 
 “The client contacts us to schedule an appointment. We meet and he 
presents us the situation. That’s the interesting part for the consultant : 
the advice that we can provide about the logic of the client demand, 
whether it make sense with the market situation. Once we have decided 
together what is the most suitable profile, we start the search” 
(Consultant). 
(2) The consultant spends a day at 
the client’s company to gain 
insights on the client's needs, the 
job requirements and the working 
environment (visit of work place, 
discussion with future manager, 
colleagues). 
“[When it’s a new client] we take time to understand who’s the 
company. We spend a day in the company  to see how it works, what is 
the working atmosphere, what is the culture of the company, etc. We 
also meet the persons who will work with the future recruited candidate”  
(Consultant). 
(3) The consultant composes an 
advertisement for the job position. 
An assistant publishes this ad 
using various channels (corporate 
website, online job search 
websites, press). 
“Once the contract with the client is signed, we start writing the job add. 
We send the job add to the client to check whether he wants to propose 
some changes. Then the client confirms his agreement” (Consultant). 
 
“The search can be organized in several ways. Either through job ads, 
through sourcing or headhunting. We do less headhunting, we use more 
ads and sourcing. We try to find candidates thanks to databases such as 
Monster or APEC” (Consultant) 
(4) Job candidates send their 
application to the consultancy 
firm, which are first processed by 
the assistant (selection based on 
CV). The consultant validates this 
first selection and repeats, if 
necessary, the selection process. 
“Once we have received some applications thanks to the job ad, the 
sourcing or the headhunting, we do a pre-selection thanks to objective 
criteria: is the candidate really looking for a job, is the candidate still in a 
company, does the candidate has the required skills? Once we have 
validated these criteria, we organize a job talk” (Consultant). 
 
 
(5) The selected candidates are 
invited to the consultancy firm for 
an interview. The client is invited 
to assist to this first meeting with 
the job candidate, but often the 
consultant does this first selection 
alone. He selects a certain number 
of candidates, variable between 
one and five..  
“For the job talk, we invite the client. To be honest, it’s less and less the 
case that the client comes. The clients want us to lead the job talk and the 
first selection” (Consultant). 
 
“The client meets the candidates during 45 minutes. Then, we meet the 
candidate during 45 minutes. While the client meets the second 
candidate, we meet the first one and vice versa. At the end of the day, we 
get together to consult and decide with which candidate we want to 
continue the process and go to the next step, the assessment” 
(Consultant) 
 
“Once we have met the candidate and the client also did, we decide 
together which candidate to select to continue the process. We can keep 
five persons, or three persons or one or two persons.The next step is the 
assessment” (Consultant) 
 
(6) The selected candidates are 
invited to the consultancy firm for 
an assessment. During two to 
 
“We invite the candidate to the assessment. It’s a tool that allows us to 
get an understanding of the candidate’s behavior at work for instance in 
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three hours, they are asked to 
complete a questionnaire (on 
paper) addressing personality, 
psycho-social, and motivational 
elements. The consultant analyzes 
the questionnaire afterwards 
during about half an hour. He then 
meets again with the candidate for 
another hour to discuss the results 
of the assessment. 
terms of relationships with the colleagues and also a tool to evaluate the 
candidate’s motivation. The assessment lasts between 2.5 and 3 hours 
and it is followed by an interview of an hour with the consultant who did 
the first interview of the selection process. So we exchange with the 
candidate before communicating the results of the assessment to the 
company. This interview is a way to better understand the results, to get 
clarifications or examples to support the results of the assessment. From 
that moment, the consultant will have enough information to recommend 
one candidate or another to the company” (Consultant) . 
 
“The candidates do our assessment test that last half a day. After the test, 
we meet them to give them a feedback, which is not the case of all 
consulting firms. For us, it’s the minimum to do so. We validate together 
the 34-34 traits of personality that emerged from the test. We ask for 
examples and illustrations to provide a detailed feedback to the compant” 
(Consultant). 
(7) The consultant transmits to the 
client his recommendations, 
orally and in a written report. 
 
“From that step, we have a file with the results of the assessment and 
some recommendations that we communicate to the client. We organize 
a meeting with the client to detail our recommendations about the 
candidate(s)”  (Consultant). 
 
“Once we have the results for the assessments, we provide a feedback to 
the client about all the candidates . We recommend which candidates are 
the more relevant and suited. Sometimes the client bypasses and takes a 
candidate that we did not recommend, but that’s the way it is…” 
(Consultant) 
(8) The client meets candidates 
selected based on the consultants’ 
recommendation. The client 
makes the final decision, but the 
consultant supports in the 
decision process by giving advice 
and guidance. 
 
“A that stage, if the client wants to continue, there is one last interview, 
or two interviews depending on the company, to meet again the 
candidate and finalise the recruitment process” (Consultant). 
 
“Then, the client meets the candidates with whom he wants to continue 
the process. This interview is decisive” (Consultant). 
 
(9) The consultant follows the 
candidate and the client for a 
period of six to twelve months, 
monitoring if the candidates’ 
integration goes well and if the 
job corresponds to the candidates’ 
expectations. 
 
Finally, there is the follow-up. To be frank , in our company it’s 
formalized, we're supposed to follow the person during 6 months or a 
year. We call the person and/or his/her manager from time to time. Each 
consultant adapt this follow-up according to the relationship he has with 
the client. It’s more or less formalized. But we try to  closely follow-up 
the candidate. Nowadays, it’s important for consulting firms to closely 
follow-up the candidates because we have to respect guarantee clauses. 
If something goes wrong with the candidate, we have to replace him/her. 
The close follow-up also allows us to keep the connection with the client 







Table 5: Interactions of routines with the recruitment routine 
 Enhancing effect Neutral effect Disruptive effect 
Financial routine Fee sharing rule for 
integrated routine is 20% for 
the contracting consultant 
and 80% for the producing 
consultant. Not a problem as 
such. 
 
But: Fee sharing is not 
interesting enough for target 
consultants because of the 
higher fixed pay and the fact 
that they receive their 
variable pay on a yearly 
basis.  
 
Market routine  Prices divergent, problem 
for positioning.  
 
Assessment requires 
candidates to come do a 
three-hour assessment which 
they do not have time for 
because they are still 
employed. Also, and 
importantly, the 
disqualifying of headhunted 
candidates by the 
assessment tool increases 
the rarity of the resource 
then.   
Organization routine  Local separation of teams. 
 
Information system not 
mutualized leading to lack 
of information on 
“headhunting territory”. 
As at the acquirer a 
consultant is an expert of a 
given industry / job 
function, but at the target 
consultants are generalists, 
so working on all type of 
jobs or industries, the 
likelihood that a generalist 
would sub-contract an 
assignment to an expert is 
low. (unilateral benefit). 
 
Assessment tool generates 
paper based extensive 
reports which are not 
conveying the high-end 
positioning when 







Figure 1: Combining Two Routines 
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